De-democratisation and the rights of street vendors in Kampala, Uganda by Young, Graeme
  
 
 
 
 
Young, G. (2018) De-democratisation and the rights of street vendors in Kampala, 
Uganda. International Journal of Human Rights, 22(8), pp. 1007-1029. 
 
   
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 
advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/209380/  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 5 February 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
  
  1 
 
De-Democratisation and the Rights of Street Vendors in Kampala, Uganda*† 
 
Abstract: For a large segment of the urban poor in Kampala, Uganda, street vending 
has long served as a key livelihood strategy in the absence of formal employment 
opportunities and a public social safety net. This article explores the effects of de-
democratisation on the rights of street vendors in Kampala, describing how changes to 
local government institutions and processes have forced vendors to adopt new 
strategies to assert their rights in an environment of closed political space. It argues 
that for street vendors in the city, economic and social rights are fundamentally rooted 
in political rights. As de-democratisation has robbed them of their political rights, it 
has also robbed them of their ability to assert their right to engage in their economic 
activities, leaving them increasingly vulnerable and marginalised. Barring a 
fundamental change in the city’s political landscape, the hardships that vendors face 
appear to have no end in sight. 
 
Keywords: Street Vending; Informal Economy; De-Democratisation; Political Rights; Economic 
and Social Rights; Uganda  
 
 Street vendors are a prominent feature of urban life in Sub-Saharan Africa. In cities where 
formal employment creation fails to keep pace with labour market expansion, the ability to sell 
goods in busy public spaces offers important livelihood support for a highly marginalised and 
vulnerable segment of the urban poor. Local and national governments, however, are often hostile 
to the practice, viewing it as a manifestation of urban disorder and an obstacle to development, 
and many actively seek to eradicate it.1 Such efforts make street vending a highly politicised 
activity, and force street vendors to adopt a variety of strategies to assert their right to engage in 
their economic activities. The efficacy of these strategies has a profound impact on their 
livelihoods.  
Many issues surrounding the ability of street vendors to assert their rights deserve further 
attention. What conditions allow vendors to successfully defend or advance their rights, and how 
and why do these change? How can vendors continue to assert their rights in the face of state 
repression? And how are violations of vendors’ economic and social rights tied to other forms of 
exclusion? This article addresses these questions by examining how street vendors in Kampala, 
Uganda have been impacted by a process of de-democratisation that has rolled back much of the 
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political progress that the country has made under the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and 
President Yoweri Museveni since the end of the civil war in 1986.  
De-democratisation is an increasingly widespread global phenomenon. According to 
Freedom House’s annual ‘Freedom in the World’ report, 67 countries experienced a decline in 
political and civil liberties in 2016, marking the 11th consecutive year in which global democratic 
losses outnumbered gains.2 The report identifies Uganda as the joint-23rd worst performer over the 
past ten years.3 Although scholarship has begun to explore how both street vendors4 and the urban 
poor5 are able to advance their interests by participating in democratic and/or clientelistic politics, 
and important insights have been made into how political structures shape the occurrence, forms 
and success of collective action,6 the implications of de-democratisation for the economic and 
social rights of marginalised groups have yet to receive adequate attention.7 This article pursues 
this potentially fruitful line of research.   
 The city of Kampala, Uganda provides an excellent context in which to study the rights of 
street vendors. While the previous local government body in the city, the Kampala City Council 
(KCC), offered street vendors the type of political leverage that they have been shown to enjoy 
elsewhere,8 the new local government body, the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA), has 
closed these channels of influence as the central government has sought to reassert its authority in 
the city. This dramatic political transformation has forced street vendors in Kampala to find new 
ways of asserting their rights in a highly repressive environment. By analyzing these actions and 
highlighting the degree to which the forms that they take and the success they have are dependent 
on the political environment that vendors are forced to operate in, this article argues that the 
process of de-democratisation in Kampala has limited the ability of street vendors to assert their 
right to engage in their economic activities. The economic and social rights of street vendors in 
Kampala are therefore highly dependent on their political rights; when vendors lose their ability 
to participate in politics, they lose their ability to secure their livelihoods in a highly exclusionary 
urban economy, ultimately leading to further marginalisation and exacerbating the conditions of 
extreme poverty in which they live.  
This article begins by exploring the relationship between street vending and democracy 
and framing the practice in the context of human rights. It then discusses the economics of street 
vending as a means of elaborating on the structural constraints that vendors face as they engage in 
their activities and seek to assert their rights.  After briefly outlining its methodological approach, 
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it subsequently describes the process of de-democratisation in Kampala, demonstrating how 
closing political space has led to the exclusion of street vendors from local politics and, ultimately, 
the repression of street vending in the city. It then explores three contrasting strategies that street 
vendors have employed to assert their rights in response to their changing circumstances: co-
operating with the local government to establish a market for street vendors to relocate to; engaging 
in forms of individual resistance to remain on the streets despite the criminalisation of their 
activities; and organising to engage in advocacy and mutual assistance. The obstacles that these 
strategies have faced and the limited success that they have experienced are highlighted. Finally, 
it explores how presidential elections—the primary democratic process that street vendors are still 
able to participate in—still provide brief periods of opening political space by describing how the 
2016 elections allowed vendors to escape repression and return to the streets of Kampala, and how 
the repression of street vending resumed shortly after the elections were over, all but eliminating 
the gains that vendors were able to make.  
 
Street Vending and Democracy  
 The repression of street vending is a common feature of urban politics in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Global South more generally.9 Following colonial understandings of urban order 
and neoliberal notions of modernity and development,10 state officials, often with the support of 
an expanding urban middle class and formal businesses, commonly seek to remove vendors from 
city streets through arrests, harassment, the confiscation of goods, large-scale evictions and 
formalisation campaigns.11 These efforts are justified through arguments about economic 
efficiency, competition, revenue maximisation, aesthetics and urban order, suggesting that street 
vendors have no place in modern, well-functioning cities and urban development processes.12  
The relationship between street vendors and the state is not static over time, however, but 
rather characterised by ambivalence, fluctuation and uncertainty13 as it frequently alternates 
between various forms of repression, neglect, inclusion and support.14 In certain circumstances, 
street vendors have demonstrated the ability to play an active role in this relationship by exercising 
political influence in ways that allow them to remain on city streets. This influence is derived from 
the disconnect that can exist between the regulatory capacity and regulatory intent of a state;15 
even when a state has laws that regulate street vending and possesses the necessary capacity to 
enforce its laws, it may lack the willingness to do so if enforcement does not logically follow from 
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the political calculus faced by its officials. Cross’s work on Mexico City, for example, explores 
how officials tasked with implementing laws governing street vending often seek vendors’ support 
for personal advancement within a hierarchical single-party structure, highlighting how poor state 
integration can create a gap between policymaking and enforcement.16 Similarly, Holland 
describes politicians’ unwillingness to enforce laws as ‘forbearance’, a form of redistribution to 
the poor that serves as an alternative to inadequate welfare provision, and claims that enforcement 
depends on whether social programs exist to provide alternative means of support and whether 
politicians depend on the urban poor for votes.17 In settings where street vending plays a major 
role in urban livelihood provision, democratic systems with competitive elections and inclusive 
decision-making processes incentivise politicians who value political office more than 
enforcement to make broad-based appeals to the urban poor in an attempt to gain their support. 
Taking advantage of the opportunity for mutual benefit, politicians and voters enter into what 
Tendler terms a ‘devil’s deal’ in which votes are implicitly or explicitly exchanged for protection.18 
While the incentives that produce such an exchange do not hold under all electoral conditions,19 it 
is clear that they allow street vendors to exercise a degree of political influence that is 
disproportionate to their socioeconomic marginalisation.   
Perhaps counterintuitively, therefore, democratic institutions and processes do not 
necessarily accompany the rule of law, but can instead create a situation in which laws that target 
large segments of the urban poor remain unenforced. It is by taking advantage of their power as 
voters that street vendors are best able to minimise enforcement and assert their right to trade on 
the streets. This situation, however, makes them vulnerable to periods of political and institutional 
transformation.20 De-democratisation, by transforming the incentive structure that politicians face 
and removing the political leverage that vendors can exercise as voters, represents a particularly 
acute threat.   
 
Street Vending and Human Rights 
 International human rights law provides no explicit protections for the right of street 
vending. Nevertheless, vendors are subject to the more general rights outlined in human rights 
treaties, most notably the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). Article 6 of the ICESCR recognises the right to work, including ‘the right of everyone 
to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he [sic] freely chooses or accepts’.21 While 
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street vending does not constitute formal employment—work that is fully taxed and regulated by 
the state—it serves as one of the only realistic forms of income generation for the urban poor when 
states cannot or will not take steps to promote formal job creation. Article 6, furthermore, makes 
no reference to the formality of the ‘work’ that it describes. It is this right to engage in productive 
economic activity that street vendors seek to protect and that is constantly threatened by state 
repression. More generally, street vendors receive few protections for a broad range of economic 
and social rights by the Ugandan state, including the right to social security (Article 9), the right 
to an adequate standard of living (Article 11), the right to health (Article 12) and the right to 
education (Article 13), tying their access to these rights to their independent income generation. It 
is the primary contention of this article that political rights—specifically the right to participate in 
politics, outlined most notably in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) as the right ‘to take part in the conduct of public affairs’ either ‘directly or through 
freely chosen representatives’—provide an essential foundation for economic and social rights for 
street vendors in Kampala.22 When these political rights are realised, vendors are able to assert 
their right to engage in their economic activities; when they are not, this ability greatly diminishes.  
 While international treaties may provide a legal or normative framework for 
conceptualising the rights of street vendors, they remain far removed from the realities that vendors 
experience in their efforts to assert their rights in their daily lives. Uganda, like most states, has 
signed and ratified both the ICESCR and the ICCPR. For street vendors, however, this is largely 
inconsequential. The existence of formal institutions and legal protections is far less important 
than how rights are asserted and respected in everyday contexts, meaning vendors must 
continuously negotiate their rights with politicians, state officials and other interest groups in a 
highly contentious and constantly evolving political environment. Political rights are crucial for 
allowing vendors to participate in these negotiation processes because they allow vendors to 
leverage their power as voters when claiming the right to participate in their activities. As de-
democratisation strips away vendors’ political rights, it forces them to adopt new strategies for 
asserting their rights that experience little success in the face of diminished state responsiveness 
and heightened state repression. Without the right to engage in their economic activities, street 
vendors have few other means of alleviating the conditions of extreme poverty in which they live. 
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The Economics of Street Vending  
At its core, street vending is defined by a clear labour market failure: when high labour 
supply driven by rapid urbanisation and population growth coexists with low demand for low-
skilled labour, limited opportunities for formal employment force jobseekers into informal 
income-generating activities. Trading on the streets is often an obvious livelihood source for those 
who lack formal employment due to its low entry costs, its minimal capital and skill requirements 
and the access it provides to potential customers. Despite the socioeconomic exclusion that street 
vendors face, however, their activities can be intricately tied to the formal sphere and highly 
dependent on local and national patterns of supply and demand.23 As Teltscher notes, product and 
capital supply provide crucial linkages, and the access that vendors have to each can have a major 
impact on the success of their activities.24 In Kampala, street vendors typically sell small amounts 
of agricultural and/or manufactured goods, the former often purchased directly from producers or 
intermediaries during deliveries into the city and the latter obtained from wholesalers, who in turn 
acquire their goods from domestic and international producers. Some street vendors even purchase 
goods from formal businesses or other informal traders to resell at a higher price in more desirable 
locations. Most are severely constrained by a lack of access to capital due to prohibitive interest 
rates and collateral requirements imposed by formal banks, private moneylenders and even 
microfinance organisations, limiting potential income growth in a trade that is already defined by 
high degrees of poverty and precariousness.  
Formal-informal linkages also exist on the demand side. Street vending serves as an 
invaluable source of low-cost goods and services for a broad range of urban residents in Kampala, 
particularly as lower business costs mean vendors are able to offer customers lower prices, 
allowing them to enjoy a competitive advantage over their formal rivals and giving them a general 
appeal. Customers of street vendors are not just the urban poor, meaning wages earned in formal 
employment can directly enter the informal sphere. Some formal businesses even purchase goods 
from informal vendors for resale, meaning the passage of goods between the formal and informal 
spheres occurs in both directions. This demand exists due to a lack of low-cost goods in the formal 
economy, making street vending an important if underappreciated link in the supply chain of small 
businesses that seek to maximise their profit margins.  
This interconnectedness means that street vendors can be deeply affected by fluctuations 
in the formal economy. On the supply side, rising prices for the goods that vendors buy force them 
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to raise their own prices, making them less competitive and their goods less affordable for poorer 
customers. On the demand side, underperformance in the formal sphere in terms of growth, 
employment or wages can impact the informal economy by reducing customers or disposable 
income. As this article demonstrates, however, it is not merely economic change that can threaten 
vendors’ livelihoods. Political transformation, although seemingly far removed from the everyday 
concerns that vendors face, can be just as consequential. 
 
Methodology 
Research for this article was undertaken in Kampala during two phases in 2015, and 
consisted primarily of semi-structured interviews with present and former street vendors, 
politicians, civil society workers and other informal traders.25 A total of 37 current or former street 
vendors were interviewed for this project, many on more than one occasion, and an additional 97 
people were interviewed in a broader study of the politics of informal vending in the city. 
Interviews were often complemented by spending extended periods of time with street vendors in 
order to further understand their activities, experiences and responses to repression, including 
when and how certain strategies are used, what they specifically entail and what effects they have. 
Documentary analysis was also employed to clarify, expand on and fill in certain gaps of 
information collected during fieldwork, and involved both the study of national and local 
legislation concerning street vending as well as a comprehensive search through the archives of 
the country’s two largest daily newspapers, New Vision and The Daily Monitor. 
Research for this article was conducted in two locations in Kampala. The first was the city 
streets of Nakasero, which makes up a considerable portion of Kampala Central Division and is, 
with major government buildings and the city’s Central Business District, the city’s political and 
economic centre, and Kisenyi, an adjacent built-up area to the southwest of Nakasero. Both are 
prime areas for street vendors in Kampala and, particularly Nakasero, places targeted by authorities 
in their efforts to remove vendors from the city’s streets. The second fieldwork location was Usafi 
Market in Katwe, an area that is immediately south of the eastern portion of Kisenyi. Although 
Usafi is a market, it is considered here because it was established by street vendors and the KCCA 
as a site for street vendors to relocate to in order to comply with the KCCA’s ban on street vending. 
It is the only market in Kampala that was set up for this purpose.  
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De-democratisation and the Repression of Street Vending in Kampala 
The evolution of democratic institutions and processes has been a defining feature of 
Ugandan politics under the NRM. After coming to power in 1986, the NRM gradually introduced 
a series of decentralisation and democratisation reforms as a means of securing its legitimacy and 
building its popular support across the country, culminating in the adoption of a new Constitution 
in 1995,26 the introduction of regular presidential and parliamentary elections in 1996 and the 
establishment of a hierarchical local government structure that was codified in 1997.27 The 
political self-interest that drove these reforms ensured that they were always designed and 
implemented in ways that would further the NRM’s monopolisation of power and either 
abandoned or reversed as necessary. Most notably, the Movement system of ‘no-party’ democracy 
that was outlined in the Constitution and the 1997 Movement Act effectively created a one-party 
state,28 while the eventual introduction of multiparty politics in 2005 occurred as a broader trade-
off that eliminated presidential term limits and strengthened executive power.29 The NRM’s time 
in power has also seen the proliferation of extensive patronage networks, the personalization of 
political power around Museveni and targeted efforts to undermine independent and oppositional 
groups.30 Still, as the experience of Kampala demonstrates, the decentralisation and 
democratisation reforms introduced by the NRM allowed for a level of genuine political 
participation and competition, particularly at the local level, that was unprecedented in the 
country’s post-colonial history. This, however, would prove to be temporary.  
Street vending in Kampala is inseparable from the city’s politics.31 The KCC had the power 
to regulate street vending under the country’s Trade (Licensing) Act of 1969, and reaffirmed its 
apparent commitment to do so as late as 2006 with the passage of the Local Governments 
(Kampala City Council) (Maintenance of Law and Order) Ordinance. Both pieces of legislation 
mandated that street vendors must possess a valid license granted by the local authorities, allowing 
the KCC, in theory, to control and limit commercial activities on the city’s streets.32 In practice, 
however, the KCC’s regulatory powers were inconsistently exercised and often neglected, and 
became, like so much else in the city following the decentralisation and democratisation reforms 
adopted by the NRM, highly politicised. The NRM’s reforms, culminating in the 1997 Local 
Governments Act, gave the KCC significant power and autonomy to manage the affairs of the city 
while also placing it under the control of locally elected officials, creating a deeply divided political 
landscape in which the NRM and the opposition were in constant competition. This presented 
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street vendors with a unique opportunity: since local politicians often cared more about partisan 
battles and remaining in office than policy formation and implementation, it was possible for street 
vendors to exchange the political support they could offer for favourable treatment from self-
interested officials.33 This is precisely what they did. While harassment and occasional evictions 
still took place, vendors were able to use their political influence to limit the KCC’s regulatory 
ambitions and remain on the streets. Street vendors may have lacked de jure rights to engage in 
their activities, but Kampala’s competitive political environment allowed them to guarantee de 
facto rights as an important urban voting demographic. 
The opposition quickly established itself as the main political force in Kampala following 
the NRM’s reforms, winning the four mayoral elections held under the KCC and dominating city 
council positions. The central government, however, proved unwilling to surrender control of the 
country’s largest city and political and economic centre to the opposition, and in 2011, it disbanded 
the KCC and introduced a new local government body, the KCCA. In contrast to the KCC, the 
KCCA is structured in a way that invests significant political power in centrally appointed 
technocrats rather than locally elected politicians, taking away the connection between local 
government policy and popular support that street vendors had previously been able to take 
advantage of.34 The impeachment of Erias Lukwago, the popular opposition Lord Mayor, in 2013 
shifted power away from elected officials even further. In an effort to establish its legitimacy, the 
KCCA immediately began implementing ambitious development and urban governance plans 
aimed at transforming Kampala into a ‘modern’, well-ordered, well-managed city. Street vending, 
a practice seen to embody the very chaos and disorder that the KCCA sought to eradicate and to 
stand in the way of the new local government’s plans for the city, was quickly banned in September 
2011 as the KCCA chose to exercise the regulatory powers that the KCC had long neglected.35 
Street vendors, lacking the channels of influence that they had enjoyed under the previous city 
government, were unable to alter the KCCA’s decision.36 
The effects of the KCCA’s ban on street vending have been both serious and significant. 
There were an estimated 8,500 street vendors in Kampala when the practice was criminalised;37 
this total has since declined by perhaps 80-90%.38 Street vendors who have continued to operate 
in Kampala despite the city’s ban face arrest by the KCCA. The scale of these arrests has been 
considerable: in just one three-month period from January to April 2013, for example, 633 people 
were arrested and charged for street vending in Kampala.39 Vendors are often unable to afford 
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legal representation, and the courts that vendors are tried in are run by the KCCA, causing some 
to question their accountability and impartiality.40 Although it is difficult to verify exact numbers, 
critics claim that hundreds of vendors or more are in prison at any given time after being tried in 
KCCA courts.41 The fines that accompany arrests can also be extremely burdensome, and can, for 
such a poor segment of the city’s population, be virtually unaffordable. One street vendor 
interviewed for this project recalled being arrested, fined 500,000 Ugandan shillings (UGX)42 and 
sent to prison for six months, where ‘they treat you like any other prisoner, like a thief or a murderer 
or that kind of thing’ just for engaging in the unregulated sale of goods on the city’s streets.43 When 
he was released, he returned to street vending because he ‘had no option’; no other means of 
livelihood support were realistically available.44 In 2013, the KCCA also began arresting the 
customers of street vendors for supporting an outlawed activity and undermining eradication 
efforts.45 Even when street vendors are not arrested, they may still have their goods confiscated, a 
punishment that can be quite severe since the costs of acquiring new goods to sell can be high, 
particularly in relation to often meagre profits and savings.  
The criminalisation of street vending has had a significant impact on the livelihood 
strategies of a large segment of the urban poor in Kampala. Income acquired through street vending 
usually provides for no more than basic subsistence, and the costs incurred in dealing with state 
officials through fines, the loss of goods and lower sales due to a climate of fear have depressed 
already low profits. Vendors commonly face food insecurity and limited access to housing, and 
many live in the slums that house approximately 85% of the city’s poor population46 or simply 
sleep on the streets. Poor government service provision means that vendors also need to pay for 
things that might, under different circumstances, be free or more affordable, including 
transportation, healthcare and education. School fees, which are charged for all levels of education, 
are a particular burden for vendors, many of whom are single parents, as the inability to pay can 
perpetuate extreme poverty by forcing children to leave school, after which they commonly enter 
the informal sphere due to a lack of alternative means of livelihood support.  
The repression of street vendors has been particularly harsh given the role of the state in 
producing and sustaining informal economic activity through poor economic management. Not 
only has the government failed to ensure that formal job creation keeps pace with rapid population 
growth and urban migration, but it has also, by adopting large-scale liberalization reforms that do 
not prioritise employment, failing to provide adequate protections for the urban poor and 
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exacerbating geographic developmental divisions, greatly contributed to the conditions that allow 
urban informality to flourish. This fact has not been lost on many who have criticised the KCCA 
for its treatment of vendors. Lukwago has castigated the government for adopting ‘draconian’ 
policies as a substitute for its failure to aid the country’s manufacturing and agricultural industries 
as well as the unemployed, and says that street vendors ‘have nowhere to go’ because the 
government ‘has not developed alternatives’.47 ‘The reason they do their business is a breakdown 
of economic policy’, Lukwago claims, so the ban ‘is not really about street vending’, but rather 
the fact that the government ‘has no real policy to help the urban poor’.48 One street vendor 
complained that the government would rather put vendors in jail and confiscate their goods than 
give them jobs or aid their businesses. ‘This is what it’s like in Uganda’, he complained. ‘It’s like 
we are not Ugandans.’49 
 
Responding to Repression 
 The de-democratisation of Kampala that occurred with the introduction of the KCCA has 
severely restricted the ability of street vendors to assert their right to engage in their economic 
activities. The competition between local politicians with control over policy formation and 
implementation that existed under the KCC was significantly reduced, leaving vendors without the 
avenue of influence that they had long taken advantage of. Unable to exert political influence, 
street vendors have been forced to respond to repression in other ways. These can generally be 
classified into three categories: efforts to co-operate with the KCCA; the employment of individual 
resistance strategies to remain on the streets despite the ban; and attempts to engage in further 
organisation. Such actions have met with limited success and are often motivated by desperation 
or necessity, and have consistently been confronted by further state power, highlighting the reality 
that, in the absence of favourable political circumstances, street vendors face increasing 
vulnerability and marginalisation.  
 
Co-Operation 
Street vendors who have complied with the KCCA’s ban have left the streets of Kampala. 
Many have left the city altogether and returned to the countryside, where they had originally 
migrated from in search of better economic opportunities that now no longer exist. The state, for 
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at least one segment of the urban poor, has thus been able to use its coercive power to stem or even 
reverse the predominant trend of urban migration.  
The KCCA’s position is that street vendors need not return to the countryside, or even give 
up vending. Its solution is instead for street vendors to relocate to the city’s markets. When 
announcing the ban in 2011, it claimed that it had identified over 8,000 spaces in 69 markets around 
Kampala that the city’s 8,500 street vendors could move into.50 Street vendors could still sell their 
goods in the city, but would just have to do so in designated areas. This plan, however, has notable 
flaws. Most obviously, the fact that market vendors, unlike street vendors, have to pay fees for the 
use of market space means that moving to markets would entail new and continuous costs for street 
vendors. In Owino Market (the largest in the city), for example, access to the least expensive 
market space costs 8,000 UGX per month; since street vending is a low capital activity and profits 
are small, such fees, while modest, are burdensome and can even make market vending difficult 
to afford.51 These costs also mean that important divisions exist between market and street vendors, 
since, like other traders, some market vendors view street vendors as a source of unfair 
competition. Markets in Kampala have their own internal hierarchies as well, along with 
significant problems surrounding ownership and development. Their lack of appeal to street 
vendors is therefore understandable.    
Similar problems have characterised the primary attempt by street vendors to co-operate 
with the KCCA. Knowing that street vending would be outlawed under the new city government, 
leaders of some of the largest street vendors’ associations in the city joined together to request that 
a new market be created in Kampala to accommodate the vendors who would be evicted from the 
city’s streets. Their request was granted by Parliament, and the KCCA entered into an agreement 
with a company called Safinet Uganda Ltd., owned by Omar Nasoro Ssekamatte, to establish a 
market for street vendors on a plot of land in Katwe, close to a busy traffic junction near the Pan 
African Freedom Square that links the southern part of the city with Kampala’s Central Business 
District. The market was to be named ‘Usafi’, and the new association duly adopted the name 
‘Usafi Vendors Association’.  
Usafi Market opened on February 4, 2013.52 It has been plagued by problems ever since. 
Vendors at Usafi Market may be free from the harassment that they would have faced on the streets 
and able to trade their goods in a well-organised market, but they are having difficulty accessing 
the customers that they need to sustain their businesses. Problems caused by a lack of customers 
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were initially compounded by the excessive cost of rent at Usafi Market. Safinet originally charged 
120,000 UGX per month for rent, a high amount in relation to both vendors’ income and 
comparable rates at other markets.53 Usafi Vendors Association tried to get the rent lowered, 
arguing that vendors could only afford to pay 10,000 UGX per month.54 Ssekamatte, however, 
ignored their pleas; in the words of one respondent: ‘He said it was a business. He wanted to make 
profits.’55 According to another, his attitude was ‘if you can afford it, you stay. If you can’t afford 
it, you move out.’56 These costs have forced vendors to raise their prices, making them less 
competitive. Without the ability to offer low prices or easily access potential customers, vendors 
lose the very advantages that make street vending a viable livelihood strategy. Usafi Market may 
provide shelter from the repression that vendors face on the streets of Kampala, but for many, it 
also makes vending economically unsustainable.  
The high cost of rent led to conflicts between vendors and Safinet. The KCCA eventually 
intervened, first by reducing rent to 80,000 UGX per month in June 2013, then by taking over the 
management of the market in January 2014 and finally by purchasing the market from Safinet in 
April 2015.57 The KCC had sold the lease to the land to Ssekamatte in early 2011 for 110 million 
UGX; the KCCA reacquired the lease for 39 billion UGX.58 Upon purchasing the market, the 
KCCA reduced the rent charged to vendors to 6,500 UGX per month. This, however, could change; 
as one respondent warned: ‘it’s just the beginning. Just wait.’59 The KCCA also suspended the 
Usafi Vendors Association, an act that members felt robbed vendors of their ‘voice’ in the 
market.60 In August 2015, the chairperson and spokesperson of Usafi Vendors Association were 
arrested for leading a demonstration against the KCCA’s reallocation of market stalls.61 The 
KCCA instead oversaw elections for representatives from all of the zones in the market, but in 
December 2015 introduced a new, unelected interim leadership that did not include these zonal 
leaders. The KCCA has promised future elections, but at the time of writing these have not yet 
taken place.62  
The problems that vendors have experienced at Usafi have caused some to question 
whether they have benefited from relocating to the market. Summarising this sentiment, one 
respondent declared: ‘we thought we would get relief, but we didn’t get what we hoped for.’63 
Before the ban on street vending, another reflected, ‘we would get by for ourselves, without 
begging. We would pay for school fees, we would pay for housing. But now, even with Usafi 
Market, we are not making enough.’64 ‘It’s a waste of time coming here’, one respondent admitted, 
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so some vendors have left the market and returned to the streets.65 Those who have returned to 
street vending, and those who never abandoned it in the first place, further undermine Usafi by 
selling similar goods for less money in more accessible locations, illustrating how the market has 
further divided and increased competition between vendors.66 They also undermine the market in 
another way: originally planned to accommodate 10,000 vendors and able to hold about 5,000 
when it opened, Usafi Market may have only held over 1,000 people shortly after it was purchased 
by the KCCA.67  
The fact that so many street vendors have left or refused to relocate to Usafi reveals much 
about the market’s problems. Street vendors in Kampala face constant harassment by the KCCA, 
with arrests, extortion and confiscations all common occurrences. While vendors are not 
completely free from harassment at Usafi, working conditions at the market are certainly better 
than they are on the streets. And yet, because of high costs and few customers, many vendors 
choose or are forced to sell on the streets instead. Doing so, however, comes with significant 
challenges.   
 
Individual Resistance 
The KCCA’s ban on street vending means that vendors who remain on the city’s streets 
are forced to adopt strategies that allow them to do so. Political influence is not an option given 
the structure and operation of the KCCA, and neither is direct confrontation since the KCCA, in 
the words of one NGO worker, has the ‘support of the government coercive machinery’.68 Instead, 
street vendors rely on certain individual resistance strategies that allow them to avoid, survive or 
otherwise cope with repression.   
A common strategy for street vendors is to bribe the KCCA’s enforcement officers, 
offering money in exchange for being left alone and allowed to continue to sell their goods. The 
primary risk that comes with this strategy is that vendors may not always have enough money to 
pay a bribe, particularly if they pay one officer only for another to demand one later. Evasion is 
another strategy that vendors commonly employ. If vendors see an enforcement officer 
approaching, they will often conceal their goods and walk away, or at least try to appear as if they 
are doing something other than street vending (such as merely loitering). Small groups of street 
vendors may co-operate in evasion efforts by alerting each other when enforcement officers 
appear. Some vendors also sell at times when enforcement is low, such as during the evening or at 
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night, and/or avoid areas of the city where enforcement is heaviest, particularly near the major 
businesses, government buildings and hotels in the Central Business District. These adjustments 
can even be good for business for reasons other than avoiding repression; selling in the evening, 
for example, gives vendors access to the many people in the city who are returning home from 
work at the end of the day, while many areas just outside of the Central Business District have 
extremely busy streets and no shortage of potential customers. 
The use of similar strategies to counter state repression has received a considerable amount 
of attention in the literature on street vending.69 For some,70 street vendors can be seen to engage 
in a form of ‘everyday resistance’ that, following Scott, may not constitute outright 
confrontation—and indeed, directly avoids it—but nevertheless resists the application of power.71 
By responding to repression by remaining on the streets, street vendors employ a practical means 
of asserting their rights and seek to insert themselves into a system of development from which 
they are actively excluded. If urban space is, in the words of Setšabi and Leduka, ‘an embodiment 
of relations of power and powerlessness’, vendors challenge their marginalisation by refusing to 
vacate the spaces that they depend on to support their livelihoods.72 Their very presence raises 
fundamental questions about who and what public space is for and how the city should be properly 
developed and managed, illustrating two seemingly contradictory views of Kampala: one, held by 
the KCCA, a large share of the city’s traders and members of the growing urban middle and upper 
classes, that Kampala should strive to be an aesthetically pleasing, decongested, well-ordered 
‘modern’ city with an effective government that acts to regulate economic competition and ensure 
security; and another, held by certain segments of the urban poor and those who operate in the 
informal economy, that the city should accommodate and provide opportunities and viable 
livelihood strategies for all of its residents, not just those who adhere to narrow and exclusionary 
understandings of development and urban governance. Street vendors constitute a segment of the 
urban poor that is seen as unwelcome in, and even an obstacle to, a modern urban landscape and 
economy; by remaining on the streets, they reject their exclusion and insist on benefiting from the 
economic opportunities the city has to offer.  
It is important, however, not to romanticise street vendors’ resistance strategies. Despite 
the forms of bribery and evasion that they employ, street vendors who have continued to operate 
in Kampala following the criminalisation of their activities commonly face arrests, fines and the 
confiscation of goods, all of which, as described above, have serious livelihood effects. The 
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physical and material costs of street vending are now significant, and individual resistance 
strategies do little more than provide temporary relief from coercive state power. Far from allowing 
vendors to assert their right to engage in their economic activities, they merely provide vendors 
with a brief reprieve from the worst effects of repression without spurring any structural change. 
To more meaningfully challenge the forms of exclusion that they face, vendors instead rely on a 
third strategy: organising. Here, too, their efforts have significant limitations. 
 
Organising 
Scholarly and policy literature regularly emphasises the potential for and achievements of 
organisation in the informal economy.73 The International Labour Organization (ILO) encourages 
organisation in the informal economy while emphasising the role that formal sector unions can 
play in such a process, and has published a number of studies on the topic.74 Several scholars have 
articulated similar positions.75 The experiences of street vendors in Kampala, however, 
demonstrate the extent to which the success of organisation efforts depends on the political 
conditions in which these efforts take place. 
The KCCA’s ban on street vending has significantly altered the organisational landscape 
for vendors in Kampala. The organisations that street vendors formerly relied on for various forms 
of support have mostly disappeared because their leaders feared or experienced harassment or co-
operated with the KCCA, primarily in the establishment of Usafi Market, leaving no large groups 
to oppose the KCCA’s ban or speak against its treatment of vendors who remain on the streets.76 
Attempts by vendors to form new organisations of any size have faced major obstacles. Since street 
vending is now an illegal activity, it is difficult for groups of street vendors to gain legitimacy and 
recognition, and fear of arrest acts as a powerful deterrent. Given the charged political environment 
that exists in the city (and in the country as a whole), some street vendors are concerned about 
being seen as participating in ‘anti-government’ activities.77 Under the KCCA, street vendors who 
wish to organise face little chance of influencing policy and a high chance of further repression. 
In such a situation, a lack of organisation is understandable.  
Street vendors who wish to organise also have important practical concerns. In August 
2013, the Ugandan Parliament passed the Public Order Management Act, which bans unauthorised 
public political discussions involving more than three people.78 As a result, vendors (like all other 
Ugandans) who plan to hold public meetings, rallies or demonstrations require official approval 
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that, given their political status, is obviously not forthcoming. Some respondents stated that when 
they try to find a place to hold a meeting, they get scared when asked about the meeting’s purpose, 
reflecting the climate of fear and intimidation in which organisation has to take place.79 It can be 
difficult to organise meetings given that street vendors generally work all day, after which they are 
often tired, stressed and busy with other obligations (such as caring for dependents). Even when 
meetings do take place, people often voice common concerns, such as difficulties arising from a 
shared condition of poverty, that have no obvious solutions.80 The fact that vendors are so focused 
on earning a living, and that doing so entails competition, also serves as an impediment to co-
operation. One respondent stated that street vendors might be able to ‘get a politician’ if they 
organised effectively, but stated that ‘it is very difficult to come together and form an organisation, 
because everyone is always on his business’ and not thinking of the benefits of co-operation.81 
Given how the KCCA is structured and operates, however, even if street vendors were able to ‘get 
a politician’, the effects would likely be limited. 
There have been some attempts by outsiders to organise street vendors. The National Union 
of Informal Economy Workers’ Organisations (NUIEWO) brings together already existing street 
and market vendor organisations to collectively advocate for vendors’ rights and provide various 
forms of aid. It is affiliated with StreetNet, an international NGO based in South Africa that 
provides financial and technical support as well as assistance with training, logistics and 
advocacy.82 The fact that NUIEWO is made up of existing organisations rather than individual 
members, however, means that it depends on these organisations to exist in the first place. Another 
organisation, Platform for Vendors Uganda (PLAVU), recruits both individual informal vendors 
and organisations in its efforts to improve vendors’ representation in policymaking and provide 
programs that improve vendors’ livelihoods. It, too, faces significant challenges. Street vendors, 
even when interested in organising, are often sceptical that progress can be made, and may fear 
that the organisation will just take their money and abandon them. Questions surrounding how the 
organisation will be able to combat repression are particularly pertinent given the KCCA’s 
commitment to eradicating street vending and its lack of responsiveness to input.83 The opposite 
of political exclusion is a problem as well; the leader of PLAVU claims NUIEWO has started 
working too closely with the government, compromising its ability to champion the concerns of 
vendors, and professed his desire to avoid being co-opted in the same way.84 The organisation also 
struggles with resources, which is understandable considering that its members are generally poor 
  18 
 
and have little money to contribute.85 This, along with the political environment in which it 
operates, makes progress extremely difficult.  
More generally, any organisations that wish to assist street vendors in Kampala must 
contend with an increasingly restrictive environment for civil society organisations that operate in 
Uganda. According to a report released by Human Rights Watch in 2012, the Ugandan government 
has ‘deployed an array of tactics to intimidate and obstruct the work of NGOs’ since 2010, 
including ‘closing meetings, reprimanding NGOs for their work, and demanding retractions or 
apologies, as well as occasional resort to threats, harassment, physical violence and heavy-handed 
bureaucratic interference to impede the registration and operations of NGOs.’86 Organisations 
whose work focuses on ‘sensitive’ issues surrounding governance and human rights that are seen 
as ‘threatening to undermine the regime’s political and financial interests’ have been particularly 
targeted.87 In March 2016, Museveni signed into law the Non-Governmental Organisations Act, 
which places all NGO activity in the country under the regulation of the central government.88 
Human Rights Watch has expressed concern about the implications that the NGO Act will have 
for freedom of association, particularly due to its reference to the ‘special obligations’ of NGOs, 
including the provision that groups must not ‘engage in any act, which is prejudicial to the security 
and laws of Uganda’, as well as its criminalisation of the failure to register civil society activity 
with the government.89 This environment acts as a significant deterrent for any civil society efforts 
to assist street vendors.   
Despite the optimism surrounding the ability of formal unions to assist organisation in the 
informal economy, unions in Kampala have not shown any interest in organising street vendors. 
Like many others in the formal sphere, unions view street vendors as a source of unfair 
competition.90 The fact that street vendors are self-employed, and therefore lack the employer-
employee relationship that unions are generally structured around, complicates matters further. 
While unions, with their significant resources and established channels of political communication, 
may have the potential to assist street vendors, the differences between the two in this case seem, 
at least at present, to be insurmountable.  
In general, most of the street vendors interviewed for this project were unaware of any 
organisations, at any level, that they were able to join and that worked to advance their interests. 
The organisations that existed under the KCC have mostly disbanded or been co-opted, and little 
has emerged to take their place. Rare attempts by street vendors to organise have been almost 
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entirely unsuccessful, while civil society groups that work with vendors face major problems of 
their own. It is the introduction of the KCCA, with its repression of street vendors and their 
organisations and the fact that it does not rely on external input and support, that has so 
dramatically altered the organisational landscape for street vendors in Kampala. With so few 
opportunities for organisation left, the ability of street vendors to assert their rights has been greatly 
limited.  
 
Street Vending and the 2016 Elections 
While street vendors in Kampala have suffered from the closing of political space that 
occurred with the introduction of the KCCA, the local and national elections that take place every 
five years still offer the possibility that political space may briefly open on a regularly recurring 
basis. The 2016 elections were the first in Kampala since the introduction of the KCCA. This is of 
course significant since the KCCA is far less dependent on electoral support than the KCC given 
the degree to which it is controlled by the central government and unelected technocrats. This does 
not mean, however, that local elections are entirely irrelevant, and more significantly, they roughly 
coincide with presidential elections, during which candidates compete for political support and 
President Museveni frequently resorts to populist appeals in his quest for victory in a city that has 
long been dominated by the opposition.91 Museveni’s electoral interests are not enough to allow 
vendors to remain on the streets indefinitely, but when they become relevant, they are something 
that street vendors are ready to take advantage of. 
Street vendors in Kampala have a history of taking advantage of favourable circumstances, 
no matter how rarely these may arise. In the past, changes to the potential costs and benefits of 
street vending have caused large numbers of vendors to return to the city’s streets, most notably 
during a strike by shop owners (which increased potential business) and when the KCCA 
suspended all of its operations following Lukwago’s impeachment due to the treatment of its staff 
by the public (which reduced repression).92 By opening up political space, elections even more 
dramatically alter the political circumstances of street vendors. It is during these times that street 
vendors are able to transcend the everyday resistance that they engage in to remain on the streets 
and instead, following Bayat’s critique of Scott, proactively make claims to advance their own 
interests in a way that is fundamentally offensive.93 Simply remaining on the streets and avoiding 
harassment by the KCCA is generally the most that street vendors in Kampala can strive for; during 
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periods of exception, however, street vendors may have the opportunity to make certain gains that 
improve their livelihoods as active encroachment takes the place of bribery and evasion in the 
struggle for public space.94 These periods are invariably followed by further repression that 
eliminates most, if not all, of the gains made by vendors and returns them to their previous position. 
Nevertheless, such times give a certain degree of dynamism to the otherwise relatively balanced 
equilibrium that characterises the relationship between street vendors and a repressive local 
government. 
A cycle of enforcement can therefore be seen to exist around elections. The repression of 
street vendors is greatest when electoral concerns are less relevant, then diminishes during election 
periods before sharply increasing again once elections are over. Street vendors interviewed for this 
project reported lower levels of repression as early as July 2015, and many returned to the streets 
in the months leading up to the elections despite warnings by the KCCA not to do so.95 In May 
2015, the KCCA began closing off Luwum Street in the city centre on Sundays in order to set up 
a temporary market for street vendors, a move that many attributed to the upcoming 2016 elections. 
Like Usafi, however, the Sunday market has significant problems. The KCCA, which runs the 
market, charges vendors a fee of 10,000 UGX for a space, making it too expensive for many, and 
a rule banning the sale of food acts as a further restriction. Traders at the Sunday market generally 
sell large amounts of goods—usually clothing or accessories—suggesting that they are not poor 
street vendors. In fact, many actually come from other markets in the city. The Sunday market 
does have one unexpected benefit for vendors, however: the KCCA officers that run and police 
the market are taken away from their usual duty of patrolling to city’s streets, reducing enforcement 
for vendors who do not relocate to Luwum Street on Sundays.96   
The NRM’s efforts to gain support in Kampala proved to be unsuccessful. In the general 
elections held on February 18, 2016, Kizza Besigye, the main opposition candidate, won Kampala 
with a total of 334,919 votes, more than doubling Museveni’s total of 157,098.97 Museveni was 
re-elected by a strong national majority, but this was his worst performance in the city in his five 
electoral victories since 1996.98 Less than a week later, on February 24, Lukwago was re-elected 
as Lord Mayor of Kampala with 75.5% of the vote, an increase of over 11% from his previous 
victory in 2011.99 Lukwago again framed himself as a champion of ‘the aspirations of the people’ 
and criticised the ‘repressive policies initiated by [the] government where a handful benefit’ at the 
expense of the majority of the city’s population.100 The NRM similarly performed poorly in the 
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KCCA council elections, losing the majority it had won in 2011 by winning only six council seats 
while Besigye’s Party, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), won 19, the Democratic Party 
(DP) won two and three were won by opposition-leaning independents.101 It also failed to win a 
single city division mayoral seat. Still, true power within the KCCA remained in the hands of the 
body’s centrally appointed technocrats, making the NRM’s poor performance in local elections 
embarrassing but not particularly costly.  
On February 21, following his defeat in the city but before the KCCA elections, Museveni 
suggested that he may have performed so poorly in Kampala due to the KCCA’s treatment of street 
vendors. The President did not express opposition to the ban on street vending, but did express his 
apparent displeasure with the fact that the evictions were carried out before a viable alternative for 
vendors to trading on the streets could be established.102 Street vendors apparently took these 
statements as a sign of support from Museveni, and returned to the city’s streets in even larger 
numbers.103 The apparent amnesty, however, did not last, and street vendors were evicted by the 
KCCA on March 11 after the electoral cycle had concluded in an exercise that was known as 
‘restoration of trade order and sanity’.104  
Despite these evictions, large numbers of vendors remained on or returned to the streets of 
Kampala. On October 19, Beti Kamya, the new Minister for the KCCA, issued a directive that 
vendors must leave the streets voluntarily or be forced out by the local government.105 Facing 
evictions and renewed harassment by the KCCA, street vendors appealed to the President to come 
to their aid.106 Given the tacit support that he appeared to offer them in the run-up to the elections, 
vendors’ hopes that he would again intervene in the city’s politics on their behalf are 
understandable. With the elections over, however, Museveni declared his support for the evictions 
on November 2, stating that the presence of street vendors harms revenue collection from the city’s 
shops and impedes the flow of traffic.107 The only support he offered was to order the KCCA and 
city divisions to establish new locations where vendors could sell their goods and instruct 
government authorities to provide vendors with financial assistance to help them relocate to 
markets.108 As usual, the support that street vendors received came mainly from the opposition in 
the city. Lukwago criticised Kamya’s eviction directive, arguing that she should stop targeting 
poor vendors and instead respect the decisions made by the KCCA’s political wing.109 On October 
24, KCCA councillors held a meeting to address the issue of street vending in Kampala in which 
they unanimously voted to allow vendors to operate on certain city roads in the evening,110 but this 
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resolution was ignored by the technocrats that hold the true power in the local government.111 The 
KCCA began its large-scale evictions the next day in an operation that was, in the words of the 
Daily Monitor, characterised by ‘bloodshed and bullets’.112 
The 2016 elections may have caused a slight opening of political space in Kampala for 
street vendors to take advantage of, but this was short-lived. The repression of street vendors has 
resumed, and there is no evidence that the KCCA will change its policies on street vending. Its 
structure and operation give it little reason to do so.  
 
Conclusion 
De-democratisation has had a profound effect on the rights of street vendors in Kampala. 
As the central government’s reassertion of power in the city has robbed vendors of their ability to 
take advantage of a competitive political environment, they have been forced to find new ways to 
assert their rights. In doing so, they have faced significant obstacles and experienced limited 
success. Vendors who have relocated to Usafi Market have struggled with the high cost of rent and 
few customers, a combination that makes it particularly unaffordable and unattractive, while the 
KCCA’s takeover of the market has robbed vendors of adequate representation. Given the 
problems that have plagued Usafi Market since its creation, it is unsurprising that many vendors 
have either returned to the city’s streets or refused to relocate in the first place. Yet continuing to 
operate on Kampala’s streets is hardly a preferable alternative. Bribery and evasion only offer a 
precarious existence in which the threat of arrests, fines or the confiscation of goods is both 
constant and all too real, and even the slightest setback could have catastrophic livelihood effects. 
Efforts by vendors to continue to organise have been limited by state coercion and co-option, 
practical limitations and the reality that such efforts come with high costs and few potential 
benefits. Elections provide some relief from repression and new opportunities to occupy public 
spaces, but as the events following the 2016 polls showed, these are temporary as periods of 
openness are invariably followed by renewed repression.  
Street vending no longer serves as an attractive source of livelihood support for a 
particularly poor segment of the Kampala’s population, leaving those who had come to rely on the 
activity increasingly marginalised and unable to improve the conditions of extreme poverty in 
which they live. Street vendors, unfortunately, have become casualties of political machinations 
beyond their control, from the central government’s takeover of the city to the KCCA’s efforts to 
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establish its legitimacy by implementing a form of development in which street vending plays no 
part. Without another period of political reform that restores the city’s democratic processes and 
institutions, it is difficult to envision their fortunes improving. 
The experiences of street vendors in Kampala underlines the degree to which economic 
and social rights can be fundamentally rooted in political rights. When vendors were able to 
participate in the city’s democratic decision-making processes, they were able to assert their right 
to engage in their economic activities; since de-democratisation stripped away their political rights, 
vendors have been forced to find new ways of asserting their economic and social rights that have 
seen little success. Their exclusion from local politics has precipitated a broader exclusion from 
economic life in the city. The arguments presented here have implications far beyond Kampala, 
suggesting a fundamental relationship between political rights and economic and social rights for 
marginalised groups in the context of de-democratisation more generally. Further consideration of 
this relationship points to valuable avenues for future research. Comparative analyses of the effects 
of de-democratisation in states that undergo similar political transitions would allow for crucial 
insights into the interdependence of rights of the poor more generally, as would comparisons of 
states with different institutional landscapes, histories of conflict, levels of development and 
political, economic and social fragmentation. Since street vendors operating in cities have a 
particular relationship with state power due to perceptions of their activities in the context of urban 
development, it would also be rewarding to consider the impact of de-democratisation on vendors 
outside of major urban centres or on other prominent informal economic activities, including 
transportation, waste picking, domestic work and employment in manufacturing, construction and 
resource extraction. The ways in which vendors’ marginalisation is compounded by gender, ethnic 
or religious divisions, as well as the potential for various forms of organisation and external 
assistance, also merit further consideration in the context of political transformation. Each of these 
avenues promises to provide important practical lessons for the defence of the rights of the urban 
poor.113 
The experiences of street vendors in Kampala highlights how inclusive political processes 
and institutions are an essential prerequisite for the realisation of a broader range of rights that are 
particularly crucial in the absence of formal employment opportunities and other forms of state 
support. It is for this reason that de-democratisation presents such a serious threat to the urban 
poor, and why it is particularly important for human rights researchers and practitioners to 
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understand the dynamics of political exclusion and work to prevent its potentially catastrophic 
consequences. 
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